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STOCK REDEMPTIONS
By MERLE H. MILLER*
The problem posed by R. H. Brown, Jr., is not an un-
common one today. That problem was how to get cash from
a closely held corporation in order to pay the estate tax due
on his father's estate without having the cash received tax-
ed as a dividend to the estate.
R. H. Brown, 9r. had been a natural born salesman, who,
with two associates and his son, had taken over an almost
defunct automobile agency in 1941. The business had pros-
pered and the end result was a nice little business for his
son to carry on, but right now the main worry was how to
get cash to pay the estate tax. There was some insurance
but that was payable to Mrs. Brown in installments. The
real estate consisted of an apartment building in which Mrs.
Brown lived and they wanted to keep that for her security
and for additional income to her. The will left one-half of
the estate to Mrs. Brown and the remainder to R. H. Brown,
Jr., and it had been intended that the interest in the auto-
mobile agency would go to the son. But now the estate need-
ed $30,000 for estate tax, and the only practical source of
those funds was the corporation.
Of course the estate might sell some of the stock of the
corporation. This would be ideal from the income tax stand-
point since there would be little, if any, tax involved because
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of the stepped-up basis of the stock to the estate. But it
would be difficult to find a purchaser, and the other stock-
holders would prefer not to take in an outsider anyway. The
next logical purchaser would be the corporation since such
a purchase would not add any new stockholders. The prob-
lem then is whether we can sell some or all of the stock to the
corporation the same as we might sell the stock to another
individual.
With a sketchy idea of the problem involved, we asked
for a recent balance sheet of the corporation, a list of stock-
holders, and a statement of dividend policy of the corpora-
tion down to date, and were supplied with the following:
BROWN MOTORS, INC.
Balance Sheet-6-30-47
Assets
Cash ............................................. $ 60,000
Accounts Receivable ............................... 35,000
Inventory ......................................... 60,000
Land and Building ................................ 60,000
Miscellaneous ...................................... 6,000
$221,000
Liabilities
Accounts Payable ................................. $ 12,000
Federal Taxes (last installment) .................... 2,000
Reserve for Taxes ................................ '7,000
Capital Stock
Preferred (500 shares) ........................ 50,000
Common (1,000 shares) ........................ 100,000
Surplus ........................................... 50,000
$221,000
Stock Ownership
Common Preferred
Brown Estate .............................. 300 200
R. H. Brown, Jr ........................ 100 100
V. Blue .................................... 300 100
W . Black .................................. 300 100
Dividend Policy
Earnings Dividends
after taxes Common Preferred
1941 Corp. organized 3/10141 .... 6,000 -0- 1,250
1942 ............................ 10,000 -0- 2,500
1943 ............................ 12,500 -0- 2,500
1944 ............................ 14,000 -0- 2,500
1945 ............................ 10,000 4,000 2,500
STOCK REDEMPTIONS
1946 ............................ 16,000 6,000 2,500
1947 Estimated to 6/30147 ........ 6,500 -0- 1,250
75,000 10,000 15,000
The preferred stock has a call value of $100 a share and
is callable at any time upon vote of the directors. The common
stock has a book value of $150 a share, and the estate would
be willing to turn in some or all of its stock at this figure.
We are told that the corporation could spare as much as
$50,000 in carrying out any plan which we might devise.
Being mindful of the danger that any distribution from
the corporation might be taxed as a dividend regardless of
what we call it, we look first for other possible solutions.
The executor might borrow the $30,000 from the corporation
and have R. H. Brown, Jr., who will inherit the stock, pay
this back to the corporation at a later date. This would, of
course, merely postpone the evil day and is a temporary
solution at best. In addition, there is the danger of incurring
liability under §102 of the Internal Revenue Code whenever
a corporation, by lending funds to a stockholder, demon-
strates that it has surplus funds which are not being paid
out as dividends.
The safest procedure from the standpoint of the estate
would be to completely liquidate the corporation. This, how-
ever, would cause the other stockholders to incur a tax on
liquidation in order to accommodate the estate. Then if they
proceeded immediately to organize a new corporation with
the same proportionate holdings, there is the possibility that
the liquidation and reorganization might be disregarded and
the retained cash treated merely as the distribution of a
dividend. If the stockholders wished to conduct the business
as a partnership, this danger would be eliminated. But it
would prove difficult, if not impossible, to have the estate
carry on the business as a partner, and the other stockholders
prefer to carry on the business in corporate form anyway.
That leaves a partial liquidation as the only practical
solution if indeed that can be worked in such a manner that
the redemption of stock of the corporation will not be treated
as the distribution of a taxable dividend. If $30,000 were
distributed to the estate and were held to be taxable income,
the estate would not have the needed $30,000 with which
to pay the estate tax after settling the income tax liability.
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Such a result is more than a mere possibility when we start
with the basic proposition that all corporate distributions are
regarded as dividends under §115 (a) unless some specific
exception is found elsewhere in the Code. Thus any amount
paid by the corporation to the estate would be a distribution
by the corporation to a stockholder, and some special pro-
vision is needed to prevent that distribution being taxed as
a dividend.
A special dispensation is granted by §115(c), which
provides that distributions in complete or partial liquidation
shall be treated as in part or full payment in exchange for
the stock. Section 115 (i) provides that "amounts distributed
in partial liquidation" means a distribution in complete can-
cellation or redemption of a part of the stock of a corporation
or one of a series of distributions in complete cancellation
or redemption of all or a portion of its stock. These two
provisions standing alone would seem to solve our problem.
We could very easily arrange to have a part of the stock
of all the stockholders, or a substantial portion or all of the
stock of the Brown Estate redeemed so as to comply with
§115(i) and thereby seemingly qualify ourselves for the
special treatment accorded by §115 (c).
However, tax lawyers have long ago learned that when
a perfectly easy and reasonable solution presents itself they
should always cherchez la catch. We do not have far to
look in this instance before we discover §115 (g) rearing its
head in a very ugly way. That section in effect holds that
even where you have a cancellation or redemption of stock
so as to seemingly qualify as a partial liquidation, the amounts
distributed may, nevertheless, be taxed as a dividend. Our
problem then is to analyze the legislative history of those
provisions and the court decisions so as to determine what,
if anything, we can do in order that the distribution of cash
to one or more of the stockholders of Brown Motors, Inc.
will be treated as a distribution in partial liquidation and not
as a distribution essentially equivalent to a taxable dividend.
PARTIAL LIQUIDATIONS
The definition of a partial liquidation as contained in
§115 (i) was first enacted in 1924 and has not been changed
down to the present time. Actually the provision is a re-
strictive one and confines partial liquidations to those situ-
ations where stock has been redeemed or where the distri-
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bution is part of a plan of complete liquidation. Since that
time, apart from distributions in complete liquidation, there
must be a redemption of stock before the distribution has
a chance of being treated as a partial liquidation.1
When the definition of partial liquidations was first en-
acted, such distributions were treated as amounts received
on the sale of the stock redeemed. They had been treated
in that manner since the 1918 Act, and that treatment was
continued down to the 1934 Act, which made the gain fully
taxable. In the 1938 Act distributions in partial liquidation
were treated as giving rise to short-term gains or losses
which was about the most adverse treatment which could
have been accorded within the ambit of the statute. At the
same time, the sale of stock to other stockholders gave rise to
capital gains and losses, and, if the stock had been held the
required time, entitled the stockholder to very definite ad-
vantages. This arbitrary classification gave rise to a great
deal of litigation and gross inequities based upon pure tech-
nicalities. If stock was to be redeemed and the stockholder
merely turned in his stock, any gain would be taxed as
ordinary income. On the other hand, if he sold his stock to
a third party who subsequently redeemed it, the gain to the
first stockholder would be taxed as a capital gain.
To cure this incongruous result, the 19a2 Act taxed
amounts received in partial liquidation in the same manner
as amounts received on the sale of the stock. This seemed
to open the gates to tax avoidance by permitting the cor-
poration to dispose of its cash through redemption of its
stock rather than by the payment of dividends, thereby hav-
ing corporate earnings taxed at capital gains rates when
distributed to the stockholders. The Ways and Means Com-
mittee was aware of this danger, but voiced the hope that
any tax avoidance as a result of the more liberal treatment of
distributions in partial liquidation could be stopped by the
application of §115 (g) to those distributions which were es-
sentially equivalent to dividends. 2
1. Jones v. Dawson, 148 F.2d- 87 (C.C.A. 10th 1945); Edward S.
Kraus,.Jr., 6 T.C. 105 (1946); A. J. Long, Jr., 5 T.C. 327 (1945).
2. Sen. Rep. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess. 116 (1942): "Under
existing law the gain realized from a distribution in partial liqui-
dation is treated, despite the provisions of section 117, as a short-
term capital gain. This treatment was occasioned by the facility
with which ordinary dividends may be distributed under the
guise of distributions in partial liquidation, although section
19481
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DISTRIBUTIONS ESSENTIALLY EQUIVALENT
TO DIVIDENDS
Sometimes statutory provisions, like people, rise above
their early surroundings and background, to an importance
wholly unpredictable from their humble origin. That is
true of §115 (g), and that is one reason why many who
are most familiar with its legislative history are apt to
underestimate the full effect of that statutory provision as
it is today construed by the courts, This is one strange in-
stance where the legislative history needs to be explained
away instead of lending itself to an understanding of the
statutory provision.
After the Supreme Court had held stock dividends to
be non-taxable, Congress became worried over the tax avoid-
ance possibilities incident to a corporation issuing stock divi-
dends and subsequently redeeming the stock, giving the
stockholders the equivalent of cash dividends without pay-
ment of the ordinary income tax. So a provision was includ-
ed in the Revenue Act of 1921 to the effect that a stock divi-
dend should not be subject to tax, but if after the distribu-
tion of such a dividend the corporation proceeded to cancel
or redeem its stock in such manner as to make the distribu-
tion essentially equivalent to a taxable dividend, the amount
received in redemption or cancellation of the stock should
be treated as a taxable dividend to the extent of the earnings
or profits accumulated after February 28, 1913. In the
1924 Act, Congress made an amendment to include redemp-
tions or cancellations before the distribution of a stock divi-
dend as well as after. It was in the 1926 Act that the present
§115 (g) was first enacted to include redemptions and can-
cellations of any stock whether or not it was issued as a stock
dividend. But while the language then enacted is the same
as that in force today, with the exception of one minor
amendment relating to depletion reserves, it has taken the
115(g) makes explicit provision for the treatment of such dis-
tributions as ordinary dividends. Inequality results, however,
under the existing law in the case of unquestionable bona fide
redemptions of stock not equivalent in any way to the distribution
of a taxable dividend. It is believed that the proper application
of section 115(g) will prove adequate to prevent taxable dvidends
disguised as liquidations from receiving capital-gain treatment.
Accordingly, this section of the bill eliminates the provision re-
quiring the gain from a partial liquidation to be treated as a short-
term capital gain,"
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courts twenty years to clear away the historical background
and apply the section according to its literal meaning.
BASIC PRINCIPLES
There are then three basic principles which we gather
from a reading of the Code provisions relating to corporate
distributions:
1. All corporate distributions are ordinary dividends
under §115 (a) and (b) unless they qualify as liquid-
ating distributions under §115(c).
2. There must be a cancellation or redemption of stock
to qualify a distribution as being in partial liquida-
tion regardless of intent [§115(i)].
3. There is no magic in redeeming or cancelling stock
as prescribed in §115(i). Such a redemption may
be a liquidating distribution under §115(c), but it is
equally apt to be taxed as a distribution essentially
equivalent to a dividend under §115 (g).
GLITTERING GENERALITIES
Almost all the basic provisions of the Code have under-
gone a substantial change in interpretation during recent
years and this has resulted in considerable confusion. That
general confusion has been unusually great with respect to
the statutory provisions relating to partial liquidations be-
cause of the fact that the original historical purpose of §
115(g) continued to haunt the courts long after the original
provisions had been interred and more vital language had
been substituted to prevent the new tax avoidance schemes
envisioned by Congress. Thus, although Congress more than
twenty years ago had eliminated the original limiting lan-
guage restricting §115 (g) to situations involving stock divi-
dends, it was only a year ago that some of our courts finally
decided that the manner of the issuance of the redeemed stock
was no longer determinative of the application of §115 (g).3
Then there were the many cases involving years prior
to 1942 where the only issue was whether stock had been
redeemed as a part of a partial liquidation, or whether it
had been sold to the corporation. Many of those cases held
that the redemption was in partial liquidation under circum-
stances which are quite encouraging to those seeking to have
3. Kirschenbaum v. Comm'r., 155 F.2d 23 (C.C.A. 2d 1946).
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a distribution today taxed as a partial liquidation instead of
as a dividend.4 In deciding whether a distribution was in
partial liquidation or was a purchase of stock by the corpora-
tion, a redemption and cancellation of the stock might well
be determinative. But when §115 (g) enters the picture and
the question is whether the distribution is in partial liquida-
tion or is essentially equivalent to a dividend, mere redemp-
tion is not determinative since the redemption may be either
in partial liquidation or equivalent to a dividend.5
Once we recognize that it is the character of the distri-
bution in redemption of the stock and not the nature of the
original issuance of the stock redeemed which is determin-
ative, and when we further eliminate the many cases involv-
ing partial liquidations in which the application of §115 (g)
was not at issue, the scene becomes much clearer and a
fairly workable pattern becomes apparent.
Where all of the stock of a shareholder is redeemed
there is no real question as to the application of §115(g).
The Regulations correctly provide that such a distribution is
in partial liquidation if the shareholder thereby parts with all
of his interest in the corporation. It is not the nature of
an ordinary dividend to cause a shareholder to be without
further interest in the corporation so that such a distribution
could only be treated as a partial liquidation.
Where less than all of the stock of a shareholder is
redeemed, then the courts require a showing that the dis-
tribution was motivated by corporate purposes if it is to be
treated as a liquidating dividend. If the distribution is
primarily for the benefit of stockholders, then it will be treat-
ed as essentially equivalent to a dividend. Thus the courts
have found the distribution to be in partial liquidation where
there was an actual contraction of business activitiess and
where there was found a corporate purpose for reducing
capital.7 But the courts have found the distribution to be es-
4. Stern v. Harrison, 152 F.2d 321 (C.C.A. 7th 1945); Gladys C.
Blum, 5 T.C. 303 (1945); Abner J. Tower, 5 T.C. 383 (1945).
5. The Tax Court failed to make such a distinction in the cases
it cited in Georgia P. Johnson, P-H 1947 TC Mem. Dec. Serv.
47,152 (1947), although the result reached could be justified
on other grounds.
6. Samuel A. Upham, 4 T.C. 1120 (1945); Heber Scowcroft Inv. Co.,
P-H 1945 TC Mein. Dec. Serv. 45,235 (1945).
7. Harry A. Koch, 26 B.T.A. 1025 (1932). But see Dunton v. Claus-
ton, 67 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.Me. 1946).
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sentially equivalent to a dividend where the corporation con-
tinued to operate as previously and showed no policy of con-
traction,8 where the distribution was induced by needs of the
stockholders rather than by any corporate purpose,9 and
where the corporation had accumulated a substantial surplus
while not paying out liberal dividends.0 Let us apply these
rather vague generalities to our problem and cite more spe-
cifically the applicable authorities which will assist us in
the selection of the best method of solving our problem.
POSSIBLE DISTRIBUTIONS
There are seven feasible methods of redeeming stock
so as to get the required amount of cash into the Brown
Estate:
1. Pro rata redemption of common stock.
2. Redemption of all preferred stock.
3. Redemption of all preferred stock of the. Brown
Estate and R. H. Brown, Jr.
4. Redemption of all of the common stock of the Brown
Estate.
5. Redemption of all stock owned by the Brown Estate,
using notes to supplement cash.
6. Sale of 200 shares of common stock by the Brown
Estate to other stockholders and subsequent redemp-
tion of all remaining stock in the Brown Estate.
7. Redemption of all of the stock of R. H. Brown, Jr.
and purchase by him of assets of the estate.
The above possibilities are set out in the order of their
appeal to R. H. Brown, Jr., disregarding for the moment the
impact of federal income taxes. But the tax consequences of
the distribution are a major item and may require a sacrifice
of other desirable ends. So we proceed to examine the tax
consequences of each possible distribution to determine which,
if any, may prove to be the lucky one of the seven possibilities.
I. PRO RATA REDEMPTION OF COMMON STOCK
The pro rata redemption of common stock would leave
8. Flanagan v. Helvering, 116 F.2d 937 (App. D.C. 1940); Pullman,
Inc., 8 T.C. 292 (1947).
9. Rheinstrom v. Comm'r., 125 F.2d 790 (C.C.A. 6th 1942).
10. Goldstein v. Comm'r., 113 F.2d 363 (C.C.A. 7th 1940). A liberal
dividend policy apparently saved the day for the stockholder in
A. C. Monk, P-H 1947 TC Mem. Dec. Serv. 47,247 (1947).
1948]
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the equity interests of the present stockholders undisturbed,
which has a particular appeal to them. It would not only get
funds into the Brown Estate but it would also let the other
stockholders participate in the distribution, and everyone
would wind up owning the same relative interest in the enter-
prise. There would not be sufficient cash, but the corpora-
tion could use notes for some of the stockholders who were
not in as great need for cash as is the Brown Estate.
But a pro rata redemption of common stock in this case
is the most certain method of having the distribution taxed
as a dividend under §115 (g). It is the particular evil which
was mentioned at the time of the enactment of that section,
and the Regulations expressly cite it as an example of the
type of redemption which will be taxed as the distribution of
a dividend." The mere fact that stock was originally issued
for value will not deter the taxation of the distribution in
redemption as a dividend, and the fact that funds are needed
by the estate is not an alleviating factor. In Flanagan v.
Helvering,12 the executor had the corporation redeem an equal
amount of the stock of the two sole stockholders in order
to get funds to meet administration expenses. Had the dis-
tribution been made as a dividend to the estate, the amount
would have gone to the heirs, and the estate would not have
had the funds to meet expenses. The court held that not-
withstanding the extraneous factors which required the dis-
tribution of these amounts by way of redemption, the net
effect to the stockholders was the same as though the amounts
had been distributed as dividends, and hence, the distribution
was taxable under §115 (g).
However, a pro rata redemption of common stock may
fall without the ambit of §115 (g) if the distribution is ac-
tually in partial liquidation of the corporation. If there is a
curtailment of corporate activities and an intent to wind
up one part of the business and distribute the unneeded assets,
11. Treas. Reg. 111, §115-9 (1939): "A cancellation or redemption
by a corporation of a portion of its stock pro rata among all the
shareholders will generally be considered as effecting a distribu-
tion essentially equivalent to a dividend distribution to the extent
of the earnings and profits accumulated after February 28, 1913.
On the other hand, a cancellation or redemption by a corporation
of all the stock of a particular shareholder, so that the share-
holder ceases to be interested in the affairs of the corporation,
does not effect a distribution of a taxable dividend."
12. 116 F.2d 937 (App. D.C. 1940).
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then the distribution may be taxed as a liquidating dividend
rather than an ordinary dividend. In order to get this fav-
ored treatment the facts must be somewhat unusual.
Samuel A. Upham was one of the principal stockholders
of a paper company that had been in existence since 1893,
during which time it had increased its capital from $18,000
to $1,000,000 by means of stock dividends. In 1938, Mr.
Upham and another stockholder discussed plans for turning
over the business to employees, and Mr. Upham wrote a
letter outlining the plan to the trust company that had been
designated as his executor. Under the plan, the stockholders
were to receive $160 a share either in cash or 31% bonds, the
employees were to form a new corporation and acquire the
assets of the old corporation upon assuming the obligation to
pay the stockholders the $160 per share. Pursuant to this
plan, the corporation redeemed 40% of the outstanding stock
pro rata at $160 a share. The Tax Court held that the pur-
pose of the redemption was the ultimate liquidation of the
corporation, and that there was also the intent to contract
business activities of the company, so that the distribution
was taxable to the shareholders as a distribution in partial
liquidation rather than as an ordinary dividend under §
115 (g) 3
Whatever may be the status of dividends in actual liqui-
dation of a corporation, the principle will not be of assistance
in this case since there is no intention on the part of the
surviving stockholders to curtail corporate activities, nor are
there any unneeded corporate assets other than cash which
might be spared to carry out the redemption. The distribu-
tion of unneeded cash is obviously not a curtailment of cor-
porate activities even if the cash not needed in the business
has been invested- in securities. In Edward L. Krauss, Jr.
Trust," the corporation was in the business of manufacturing
school slates and had acquired substantial security invest-
ments. The corporation sold these securities and distributed
13. Samuel A. Upham, 4 T.C. 1120 (1945). A similar result was
reached in Dana v. Sheehan, 66 F. Supp. 47 (E.D.Mo. 1946),
L. M. Lockhart, 8 T.C. 436 (1947) and Heber Scowcroft Inv. Co.,
P-H 1945 TC Menm. Dec. Serv. 45,235 (1945). However the
Tax Court stated in Pullman, Inc., 8 T.C. 292 (1947), that the
doctrine of these cases has been weakened by the decision of theSupreme Court in Comm'r v. Estate of Bedford, 325 U.S. 283(1945).
14. 6 T.C. 105 (1946).
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the proceeds to the stockholders, cancelling some of its stock
two years later on account of the distribution. The court
held that the distribution was not a partial liquidation in the
absence of a contemporaneous cancellation of stock, but went
on to say that even if it were to be regarded as a distribution
in redemption of a part of its stock, the pro rata distribution
would be taxable under §115 (g) since there was no intent
to reduce operations other than to eliminate the securities
investment, which could not be regarded as one of the cor-
porate purposes.
II. REDEMPTION OF ALL PREFERRED STOCK
A redemption of all the outstanding preferred stock
would require the distribution of $50,000 by the corporation,
of which the estate would receive $20,000 and R. H. Brown,
Jr. $10,000. This latter amount could be used to purchase
assets from the estate so as to make available the required
amount of cash. The common stock interests of the parties
would remain unchanged, which would make this method
particularly appealing to all parties if we can have the
transaction treated as a partial liquidation. In that event
there would be no tax to any of the stockholders as they
would be getting back their original investment.
The preferred stock is not held in the same proportion as
the common stock, so that its redemption would not be quite
as close to an actual dividend as would the pro rata re-
demption of common stock. Also the stock was originally
issued for money or property paid in at the time of incor-
poration, and it could be contended that the stockholders were
receiving merely a return of capital. But neither of these
factors is determinative. It is not essential that ordinary divi-
dend be paid pro rata in order to be taxable as a dividend
to the stockholder, and the contention that a stockholder is
merely receiving a return of his investment upon the redemp-
tion of a portion of his stock is not sufficient to preclude
the application of §115(g).
In Stein v. U.S., 15 Mrs. Stein had some Class B preferred
stock redeemed pursuant to the provisions of the stock cer-
tificates which required only action by the board of directors.
The stock had been issued at the time of incorporation for
cash paid in by the subscribers. The court held that the
15. 62 F. Supp. 568 (Ct.CL 1945).
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distribution received by Mrs. Stein on redemption of a por-
tion of her preferred stock was taxable as an ordinary divi-
dend. Mrs. Stein had at one time owned common, and it was
not proven at the trial that she was still the owner of common
stock at the time of the redemption. The court held that if
her ownership of common had changed, the burden was upon
her to prove it, and in the absence of such proof, the redemp-
tion of the preferred stock would be taxed as the distribution
of a taxable dividend.
Bertram Meyer formed a real estate holding corporation
and transferred certain properties in return for common
stock and two classes of preferred. By resolution of the board
of directors no dividends were payable on the common stock
or on the noncumulative preferred until the first preferred
stock was completely redeemed. Pursuant to this resolution
and the provisions of the first preferred stock certificates
no dividends were paid, and the first preferred stock was
redeemed as rapidly as possible. In Bertram Meyer, 8 the
Tax Court held that the redemption of the preferred stock
was essentially equivalent to the distribution of a taxable
dividend since the corporation was apparently organized in
such manner as to purport to allow the holder of all its
stock to obtain a return of his investment tax-free from the
earnings and profits of the corporation.
It is possible to have the redemption of preferred stock
taxable as a liquidating dividend under proper circumstances.
Georgia P. Johnson had some preferred stock redeemed which
had been issued to her in a merger involving three newspaper
companies. One of the merging companies had a substantial
debt which the successor corporation was required to assume.
In order that the ultimate equity interests of the parties
should not be too much affected by this assumption of in-
debtedness, stockholders of the other two merging corpora-
tions were given preferred stock in addition to their common
stock, with the intention that this preferred stock would be
redeemed as the assumed indebtedness was paid off. Hence,
upon the payment of the assumed indebtedness and the re-
tirement of preferred stock, the common stockholdings of the
three principal groups of stockholders would bear the desired
ratio. Pursuant to this plan, some of the stock of Georgia
16. Bertram Meyer, 5 T.C. 165 (1945), reversed and remanded 154
F.2d 55 (C.C.A. 3rd 1946), rehearing 7 T.C. 1881 (1946).
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P. Johnson was redeemed, and the Tax Court in Georgia P.
JohnsonW7 held that since the cancellation of the preferred
stock came within the definition of partial liquidation in §
115 (i), the distribution was taxable as a liquidating dividend
under §115(c). The reasoning of the court is difficult to
reconcile with decisions of the court in other cases; however,
the result was doubtless substantially affected by the fact that
the redemption of the preferred stock merely counter-balanced
the payments on the indebtedness of another stockholder
which had been assumed as a part of the merger.
There are no special factors in our case that warrant
any hope for better treatment than the court accorded the
redemptions in case of Mrs. Stein and Mr. Meyer. The
dividend policy of Brown Motors, Inc. has not been liberal,
and the main reason for the distribution is found in the
need of one of the stockholders. The distribution in redemp-
tion of all of the preferred stock would probably be held to
be essentially equivalent'to a taxable dividend.
III. REDEMPTION OF PREFERRED STOCK OF THE
BROWN ESTATE AND R. H. BROWN, JR.
The only real difference between redeeming all of the
outstanding preferred stock and redeeming only that owned
by the estate and R. H. Brown, Jr. lies in the fact that in
the latter instance the distribution would not be to all stock-
holders. There is no magic in this arrangement, although a
distribution to only a portion of the stockholders does not
so nearly represent the ordinary dividend distribution. An-
other factor in favor of this procedure is that those who pre-
sumably are not in need of the cash would not be running the
risk of tax in order that the estate might receive needed funds.
In R. W. Creech, s two of the principal stockholders were
indebted to the corporation in a large amount. One of the
stockholders died, and in order to discharge the debt to the
corporation, the two principal stockholders each turned in
285 shares of stock out of a total number of 2000 shares
outstanding, and the debt of each stockholder was cancelled
by the corporation. In holding that the cancellation of the
debt was not essentially equivalent to the distribution of a
taxable dividend, the Board of Tax Appeals stressed the
17. Georgia P. Johnson, P-H 1947 TC Mem. Dec. Serv. 147,152 (1947).
18. 46 B.T.A. 93 (1942).
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fact that the distribution had not been pro rata among all
of the stockholders. The Board recognized the cases in which
it had held that the distribution need not be pro rata in order
for it to be taxable as a dividend but found in this particular
case that the distribution in question should not be so re-
garded, and noted as other factors the cash dividends paid
by the corporation and the fact that the stock in question had
not been issued as a stock dividend.
Since the Creech case, we have had the Stein and Meyer
decisions taxing as dividends the distributions in redemption
of preferred stock under circumstances more nearly like
those in the present case. The Creech case is still cited, but
we decide that the mere fact that the distribution in redemp-
tion is not to all stockholders is not a sufficient bulwark
against the assertion of a tax in this case.
IV. REDEMPTION OF ALL OF THE COMMON STOCK
OF THE BROWN ESTATE
Redemption of all of the common stock of the Brown
Estate would require a distribution of $45,000 to the estate
if the stock were redeemed at book value. This is more cash
than is needed by the estate, and such redemption would
considerably reduce the ultimate interest of R. H. Brown,
Jr., who had hoped to emerge as the principal stockholder by
virtue of the inheritance from his father. Believing, however,
that the stockholders might be able to subsequently shift
their interests so as to keep the relative position which
they desired, we explore the tax potentialities of this course.
The Regulations provide that if all of the stock of a
single shareholder is redeemed so that he has no continuing
interest in the business, then such redemption is not to be
treated as the distribution of a taxable dividend.19 After
the redemption of the common stock of the Brown Estate
there would be a continuing interest in the corporation rep-
resented by the ownership of preferred stock. Is this such
an interest as would make a redemption of the common
stock essentially equivalent to the distribution of a taxable
dividend?
If the preferred stock owned by the estate is to be
regarded as a continuing interest in the corporation suf-
ficient to justify the taxing of the entire amount paid in
19. Treas. Reg. 111, §115-9 (1939).
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redemption of the common stock as the distribution of a
dividend, then you would have the anomalous situation of a
.$45,000 dividend on a $20,000 par value 5% preferred stock.
Since the determination of whether a distribution is essen-
tially equivalent to a taxable dividend is basically one of
fact, it would seem that the facts would not be present here
to justify the thxing of the entire amount distributed as a
dividend. The continuing interest referred to in the Regu-
lations should be an interest which would enable the taxpayer
to continue to share in the prosperity of the corporation.
But where a stockholder is left with only preferred stock of
a fixed dividend and liquidating value, he is certainly not in
the same relative position as he would have been had he
retained his common stock and received a dividend thereon.
While the courts will overlook minor adjustments in the rela-
tive standing of stockholders, no decisions to date have in-
dicated a philosophy which would lead to the conclusion that
the amount received in the redemption of the common stock
of the Brown Estate would be treated as the distribution of
a dividend.
We should not, however, be lulled into a false sense of
security by the fact that there are no court decisions to date
blocking this path. The Commissioner would certainly ques-
tion such a redemption and attempt to tax it as the distribu-
tion of a dividend, and there are situations where such a
contention might be upheld. Suppose, for example, that
the common stock were practically valueless and the pre-
ferred was worth only twenty cents on each dollar of its
par value. Then a redemption of the common might be
construed as essentially equivalent to a distribution of a
dividend on the preferred since the preferred stock retained
would still entitle the stockholder to participate in his full
share of the remaining corporate assets, and he would have
received the distribution in addition. In such a case, the
preferred stock really represents the equity in the corporation
and the retention of preferred stock might be held to be the
type of continuing interest which would make the distribu-
tion taxable under the Regulations.
If the Commissioner were to obtain a favorable decision
in the above type of case, we would then be faced with the
problem of distinguishing between preferred stock in a pros-
perous corporation and preferred stock in a deficit corpora-
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tion, arguing that preferred stock of a deficit corporation
represented a continuing interest under the Regulations
whereas preferred stock of a prosperous corporation would
not. Without attempting to resolve the issue at this time,
we recognize that by this method we would be stepping into
almost certain litigation.
V. REDEMPTION OF ALL STOCK OWNED BY THE
BROWN ESTATE
The redemption of all the stock of the Brown Estate
presents considerable practical difficulties. In the first place,
it would require more cash than the corporation can spare,
and in the second place, it would considerably reduce the ulti-
mate common stockholdings of R. H. Brown, Jr., as we have
previously discussed.
If the corporation were to redeem all of the stock of the
Brown Estate for cash and notes, the tax problem would be
whether the notes would constitute a continuing interest in
the corporation within the meaning of the Regulations. Cer-
tainly a noteholder has an interest in the corporation, but
it is doubtful if that is the type of interest intended as that
term is used in the Regulations. In all probability the notes
in this case would have to be made junior to the claims of
general creditors in order to maintain the credit position of
the corporation, and this would make the notes more nearly
like preferred stock. And since the notes would ultimately be
held by a stockholder, it would be easier to find a merging of
the creditor and stockholder interests. But in any event,
apart from practical difficulties, this method of redemption,
even using notes to supplement cash, should present a more
favorable alternative from the tax standpoint than the re-
demption of the common stock leaving the estate owning pre-
ferred.
In order to avoid the retention by the estate of any
interest in the corporation, we could have R. H. Brown, Jr.
purchase the preferred stock and then have the corporation
redeem the common stock from the estate. Since R. H.
Brown, Jr. does not have the cash to buy the preferred stock,
he could give a note to the estate for the stock, and then re-
ceive his own note upon the distribution of his share of the
estate.
This all merely points up the close relationship between
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R. H. Brown, Jr. and the estate, and raises the question as to
whether the estate will be regarded as a separate stockholder
for the purpose of determining whether there is a continuing
interest of the stockholder after redemption. The relation-
ship would be even closer if R. H. Brown, Jr. were the sole
stockholder. Suppose, for example, that all of the common
stock of the corporation were owned by an estate and an
individual stockholder who was the sole heir of the estate.
The redemption of the common stock owned by the estate
would have no ultimate effect upon the common stock interest
of the heir, provided there were assets in the estate sufficient
so that the stock owned by the estate would have passed on
to the heir. In either event, the heir would be the owner of
100% of the outstanding common stock. While such a con-
tention could be made in some cases, and while it is be-
lieved that the Commissioner would question a redemption
under those circumstances, it is to be hoped that the courts
will not indulge him in his contentions, for the ramifications
of such a doctrine would be most difficult to foresee. Logic-
ally, the doctrine could be applicable to the redemption of
the stock of a father whose son owned the remaining stock,
even before the death of the father.
In our case, it makes a very substantial difference to R.
H. Brown, Jr. whether the common stock of the estate is re-
deemed since his ultimate share in the ownership of the cor-
poration will be directly affected. His chance of receiving
the stock from the estate, subject to the intervening rights
of creditors, should not be a continuing interest so as to make
the redemption of stock of the estate essentially equivalent
to a taxable dividend. This should be particularly true since
he is not the sole legatee, and under the will is no more en-
titled to receive the stock or the proceeds, than is his mother.
The practical difficulties constitute the chief objection to this
method.
VI. SALE OF 200 SHARES OF COMMON STOCK BY
BROWN ESTATE AND REDEMPTION OF REMAINDER
In many cases it is necessary for the surviving stockhold-
ers and the corporation to combine in furnishing sufficient
funds to a deceased stockholder's estate. In such a case, the
surviving stockholders would buy some of the stock and the
corporation would redeem the remainder. No question has
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been raised as to the validity of this transaction with respect
to the estate of the deceased stockholder. Apparently the
sale of some stock and redemption of all the remainder quali-
fies as a distribution in partial liquidation, and the amount
distributed by the corporation is not taxable as an ordinary
dividend. In most cases, however, the stockholders who have
put up the money will want to get their money returned to
them by having the corporation subsequently redeem the
stock which they have purchased.
In Fox v. Harrison,20 a principal stockholder wanted to
liquidate the corporation so as to get needed cash and other
assets. In order to prevent liquidation of the corporation,
the minority stockholder arranged for the corporation to re-
deem some of the stock, and the minority stockholder bor-
rowed money to purchase the remainder with the understand-
ing that he would sell it to the corporation at cost. Later,
1,000 shares of the 1,424 shares so purchased were redeemed
by the corporation, and the check was used by the minority
stockholder to pay off the loan which he had negotiated in
order to purchase the stock. The court held that the re-
demption of this stock was not the equivalent of the distri-
bution of a taxable dividend since the minority stockholder
was merely acting for the corporation in purchasing the stock,
and there was no gain to him through the receipt of the check
from the corporation and the use of the check to pay the
bank loan which he had incurred in order to purchase the
stock.
Since that decision, other taxpayer-stockholders have
sought to establish their status as agents of the corporation
in the acquisition of stock which was subsequently redeemed,
but in each instance they have failed.
The most recent case is E. R. Lowenthal,21 wherein the
majority stockholder decided to take over the business then
being conducted by a subsidiary. He exchanged a portion of
his stock with the corporation for all of the stock of the
subsidiary, and then the other stockholders purchased his re-
maining interest. In order to obtain needed funds to com-
plete the purchase the stockholders borrowed money from
the corporation, and the indebtedness so incurred was subse-
20. 145 F.2d 521 (C.C.A. 7th 1944).
21. P-H 1947 TC Mem. Dec. Serv. 47,169 (1947).
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quently cancelled by the corporation in return for the redemp-
tion of the stock which had been purchased from the retiring'
stockholder. The Tax Court held that there was no showing
that the stockholders were acting in behalf of the corporation.
Since the amount distributed in redemption of the stock was
about equal to the dividends paid during a similar previous
period, the indebtedness which was so cancelled should be
taxed as a dividend.
In Wall v. United States22 the estate of a stockholder
sold its entire interest to a competitor. The surviving stock-
holder bought the stock from the competitor on installments,
and later had the corporation take over his liability on these
installments, giving the corporation the right to the stock
on completing the payments. The court held that payment
of the installment obligations by the corporation amounted
to the distribution of a taxable dividend to the stockholder
who was liable on those installment obligations since that
stockholder owned all of the remaining stock of the corpora-
tion.
This raises a question as to the possible liability of stock-
holders whose stock is not redeemed, where there have been
prior negotiations for the purchase of the redeemed stock
by such stockholders. Suppose a minority stockholder wishes
to dispose of his stock and enters into negotiations with the
majority stockholder for its sale to him. After they have
agreed upon a price, the majority stockholder arranges for
the corporation to purchase the stock from the minority
stockholder. If the negotiations had led to a binding obliga-
tion for the purchase of the stock, then the redemption 6f
stock of the minority stockholder would amount to the dis-
tribution of a taxable dividend to the majority stockholder
under the Wall case. But if there was no binding contract,
yet the stock was ultimately redeemed by the corporation at
the price which the parties had mentioned during their ne-
gotiations, could the redemption of stock by the corporation
be made equivalent of the carrying out of the contract which
could have been entered into by the majority stockholder, so as
to make him taxable on the amount distributed in redemption
of all the stock of the minority stockholder?
22. 164 F.2d 462 (C.C.A. 4th 1947).
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VIII. REDEMPTION OF ALL OF THE STOCK OF
R. H. BROWN, JR.
Since R. H. Brown, Jr. will inherit all of the stock of the
Brown Estate, it will make no difference in the long run
whether we redeem the stock of the estate or of R. H. Brown,
Jr. This, of course, is the weakness of any plan for the
redemption of all of the stock of either R. H. Brown, Jr.
or the estate, but it is a weakness that simply cannot be
avoided. Consequently, we may as well make the most of
it and redeem the stock of that party which will prove most
advantageous from a practical standpoint.
The common stock has a book value of $150 a share,
and the earnings record of the corporation will not justify
a much higher value considering the nature of the business.
Consequently, R. H. Brown, Jr. would receive on redemption
$15,000 for his common stock and $10,000 for his preferred
stock, making a total of approximately the amount needed
by the estate. Thus we could redeem the stock of R. H.
Brown, Jr. by a distribution of cash from the corporation
without the necessity of resorting to notes as we would
have to do if we redeemed all of the stock of the estate. This
would satisfy the requirements of the Regulations for the
redemption of all of the stock of a single stockholder, leaving
him no continuing interest in the corporation, unless Brown's
right to inherit from his father's estate be regarded as such
a continuing right.
The courts would have to go a long way to find such a
redemption the equivalent of a distribution of a taxable divi-
dend to R. H. Brown, Jr. Since that question is essentially
a question of fact, the dangers incident to such a course would
likewise be dependent upon the facts. If R. H. Brown, Jr.
used the redemption money to buy a part of the stock of
the estate, then it would be easier for a court to find that as
a part of a plan for the redemption of a part of the stock of
the estate, R. H. Brown, Jr. acted merely as a conduit for
the passing of the redemption money from the corporation
to the estate. If, however, the estate is in the early process
of administration, and R. H. Brown, Jr. uses the redemption
money to purchase other assets of the estate, and the Brown
Motors, Inc. stock remains in the estate subject to claims of
creditors and subject to administration for a period of time
thereafter, the proposed procedure would seem to be about
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as safe as any that could be devised for this particular prob-
lem.
In this case, the redemption of the stock of R. H. Brown,
Jr. would be even safer if the stock owned by the estate were
distributed to his mother as a part of her interest in the
estate. Then you would have a situation where not only
was all of the stock of a stockholder redeemed but the chance
that he would get other stock simply did not materialize.
However, we are not always free to do everything that would
seem to make a tax situation fool-proof, and since R. H.
Brown, Jr. wants the stock of the corporation and Mrs.
Brown doesn't, we shall have to take the chances incident
to this procedure.
SUMMARY
Naturally the methods most desirable from a practical
standpoint will prove least desirable from a tax standpoint.
The most desirable methods would be those which would
leave the stockholders most nearly in their present relative
position and those are the ones which would come nearest to
being essentially equivalent to the distribution of a taxable
dividend. The more nearly we approach the desirable prac-
tical goal, the more nearly we come to having the distribution
taxed under §115(g).
It is not difficult to conclude in this case that pro rata
distributions to all of the stockholders should be eliminated.
This is true whether the plan involves the redemption of
either preferred or common. Any distribution made in this
case arises from the need of a stockholder and is not brought
about by any corporate purpose such as the contraction of
general business activities or the elimination of one branch
of the business. The corporation has substantial accrued
earnings and profits and its dividend record is not a liberal
one, so that any pro rata distribution, regardless of how
labelled, will be apt to be treated a. a distribution of a tax-
able dividend under §115 (g).
That leaves only the possibility of the redemption of all
of the stock of a single stockholder in such manner as to
comply with the provision in the Regulations that there is
no continuing interest in that stockholder after the redemp-
tion. In this particular case, the redemption of all of the
common stock of a single stockholder who also owned pre-
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ferred should qualify under the Regulations although we feel
it would do so only as a result of a court decision since the
Commissioner would undoubtedly question it. A redemption
of all of the stock of a single stockholder using notes to sup-
plement cash, we feel, would satisfy the Regulations and
probably would not be questioned by the Commissioner. The
interlocking of the estate and the beneficiaries so as to consti-
tute the group a single stockholder for purposes of determin-
ing a continuing interest after redemption is a contingency
which we cannot resolve in this case. We shall have to await
the outcome of litigation which undoubtedly will arise if the
Commissioner follows his present course of questioning such
transactions.
Since originally we listed the possible methods of getting
cash into the Brown Estate in the order of their desirability
from a practical standpoint, we now proceed to list the meth-
ods in the order of their desirability from a tax standpoint,
eliminating the pro rata redemption of common and redemp-
tion of all preferred. We set out below the various alter-
natives in the order of their preference solely from a tax
standpoint, setting out after each alternative the number
which it bore in our list of preferences from a practical
standpoint:
1. Redemption of all stock of Brown Estate, using notes
to supplement cash. (5)
2. Sale of 200 shares of common stock by the Brown
Estate and redemption of remainder by the corpora-
tion. (6)
3. Redemption of all of the stock of R. H. Brown, Jr. (7)
4. Redemption of all of the common stock of the Brown
Estate. (4)
5. Redemption of preferred stock of the Brown Estate
and R. H. Brown, Jr. (3)
If the credit of the corporation can stand the issuance
of notes to supplement cash paid out in redemption of all
the stock of the Brown Estate, we feel confident that this pro-
cedure would be the safest from a tax standpoint. We are
reasonably certain that this will not prove feasible, and that
the stockholders will decide that the stock of R. H. Brown,
Jr. should be redeemed and that other practical considera-
tions justify whatever tax risk is incident to that course.
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CONCLUSION
As in so many other phases of the law, the answer which
seems right is dependent upon the manner in which the
problem is approached. If the taxation of distributions as
dividends is regarded as one of the sacrosanct principles of
our tax laws, then in determining whether a stockholder
had a continuing interest there would be justification for
looking beyond the particular stockholder to an estate in
which he was interested, or even in applying the concept
of related stockholders to this problem. Certainly the re-
demption of the stock of a father where the son owns all
of the remaining stock is not far removed as a practical
matter from the redemption of the stock of an estate where
the son is the sole legatee.
On the other hand, if we look at the problem from the
standpoint of the taxpayer-stockholder of a small corporation,
we see only an effort on his part to dispose of his stock
to the only logical purchaser and wonder why he should
be taxed differently from the stockholder of a large corpora-
tion whose stock is listed and whose estate can obtain needed
funds on the sale of stock to third party purchasers. The
difficulty confronting the estate of a stockholder of a small
corporation in raising needed funds is one of the great
motivating factors which is forcing owners of small cor-
porations into combining with the larger ones.
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